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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of the
University of Virginia:
STATE'S
VIOLATION OF
ORGANIZATION'S
FREE SPEECH
RIGHTS NOT
EXCUSED BY THE
NECESSITY OF
COMPLYING
WITH THE
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE.

In a five to four decision that reviewed both the right
to free speech and the Establishment Clause, the Supreme
Court held that a group's First
Amendment right offree speech
was violated when a state university attempted to comply
with the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment. In
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. ---, 115 S. Ct. --, 132L. Ed. 2d 700(1995), the
Court first determined that the
state violated an organization's
First Amendment right of free
speech by discriminating based
upon its viewpoints. The Court
then went on to hold that such a
violation was not excused in
order to comply with the Establishment Clause.
Wide Awake Productions ("WAP") was established
by a group of students of the
University of Virginia ("University") to publish a magazine
focusing on Christian viewpoints and expression and to
foster tolerance toward their
views. W AP was classified as
an independent organization of
the University and as such, was
not affiliated with the University. University guidelines allowed such groups to gain access to University facilities and
allowed funds, which were collected from a mandatory student fee, to be distributed for
payment to the independent organization' s third party contractors if such expenses were for
educational purposes. However, the guidelines specifically
. forbade payment to contractors

for an organization's religious
activity. W AP applied for funds
but was denied by the University on the basis that the magazine was a religious activity.
After exhausting their
options in the University appeals process, WAP brought suit
against the University in the
United States District Court for
the Western District of Virginia
alleging that the denial offunds
violated its rights offree speech
and press, equal protection of
the law, and free exercise of
religion. The district court
granted summary judgment for
the University, finding that there
was no free speech violation
and that the University's denial
offunds for this religious activity was justified to maintain
compliance with the Establishment Clause ofthe First Amendment. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower
court by citing a free speech
violation, but permitted the University's action because of the
compelling interest of separating church and state. The Supreme Courtofthe United States
granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by reiterating
the firmly rooted free speech
guarantees of the First Amendment. These guarantees prohibit the government from regulating speech based upon its
subject matter or substantive
content. Id at 714 (citing Police Dept. ofChicagov. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)). Included within this principle is
the more blatant and illegal
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speech restriction based upon
the speaker's viewpoint. This
includes restricting speech be~
cause of the speaker's specific
ideology or perspective. Id. at
715. However, as the Court
explained, these rul~s
nO.t
absolute in a setting such as at a
university, a state created public forum. Id A state may
exclude a class of speech in a
forum that it has created when
the exclusion is based upon the
content of the speech and is
done to preserve the purpose of
the forum. Id The state is still
forbidden, however, from employing viewpoint discrimination, even in a setting which it
has created. Id.
With these guidelines in
mind, the Court addressed
whether the University's denial
of funds to W AP based upon its
"religious activity" discriminated against WAP's viewpoints
or the magazine's contept. Id
at 716. It was acknowledged
from the outset that "the distinction is not a precise one."
Id The COlJrt held that-by denying funds to W AP because it
published a religious magazine,
the University discriminated
against the organization's viewpoint. Id. This occurred because the University's guidelines allowed the payment of
contractor's bills for organizations which dealt with or wrote
about religion, but it excluded
such payments only to those
groups that had religious editorial viewpoints. Id Thus, the
guidelines did not exclude reli~
gion as a subject matter, but
disadvantaged organizations

are
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that dealt with subjects from a
religious viewpoint.
The Court likened this
situation to a case in which a
school district, which allowed
its facilities to be used for a
wide variety of purposes by all
community groups except religious organizations, denied use
of its facility to a group which
was to show films on child rearing solely because the film was
based upon a religious perspective. Id (citing Lamb's Chapel
V. Center Moriches Union Free
School Dist., 508 U. S. ~ 113
S. Ct. 2141 (1993». TheCourt
concluded that the school district discriminated against the
group's viewpoint because any
organization could have used
the school's facilities to show
child rearing films except those
groups that were to deal with it
from a religious standpoint. Id
(citing Lamb's Chapel, 113 S.
Ct. 2141). Similarly, the University's action was deemed
viewpoint discrimination, and
thus, a violation of the free
speech guarantees. "The prohibited perspective, not the general subject matter, resulted in
the refusal to make third-party
payments, for the subjects discussed were otherwise within
the approved category of publications." Id Any group could
have discussed the issues that
W AP discussed in the magazine and receive funds, however, because W AP analyzed the
issues from their particular religious viewpoint, they were denied funds.
The Court concluded its
free speech analysis by declar-

ing that actions such as the denial of funds by the University
to a group because of its religious views could have dangerous consequences upon society. Id. at 719. If the Court
were to allow such government
actions, it would thus be allowing the State to examine publications to determine whether
they are based upon some religious viewpoint. Such a classification would have a chilling
effect upon free speech. Id.
After determining that
the University violated W AP's
right of free speech, the Court
considered whether the violation was justified by the necessity of complying with the Establishment Clause. Id at 72021. The Court began its inquiry
by reviewing the basic rationale of the Clause. To compy,
the government must adhere to
a strict policy of neutrality with
respect to religion. Id at 721.
The policy of neutrality is upheld if the government formulates and follows neutral criteria and policies, even if adherence to such criteria would confer a benefit upon a religious
viewpoint. Id. at 722. Finally,
the Court noted that it has rejected the notio~ that free speech
rights must bow to the Establishment Clause in situations
where a religious speaker participates in a government program which is neutral in its design. Id
Applying these principles, the Court determined that
the University's program in
question was neutral toward
religion. Id at 722. There was
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no allegation that the University created the fund either to
advance or aid a religion, and
the program did not create an
impression that the University
endorsed any particular religious belief Id. "The program
respects the critical difference
'between government speech
endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids,
and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech
and Exercise Clauses protect. '"
Id at 723 (quoting Board oJEd.

oJWestside Community Schools
(Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S.
226, 250 (1990) (emphasis in
original». Therefore, the University's program withstood an
Establishment Clause inquiry.
Finally, the Court reiterated that WAP was not a religious organization, but rather a
publication with religious
views. Id at 725. The denial of
funds was based upon a determination by the University after reviewing the content of the
publication. This was a violation of the Constitution. Id
The publication was an outlet
"for the expression of ideas,
ideas that would be both incomplete and chilled were the
Constitution to be interpreted
to require that state officials
and courts scan the publication
to ferret out views that principally manifest a belief in a divine being." Id The right of
free speech would be violated if
the Court imposed a "baseline
standard ofsecular orthodoxy,"
which in essence is a form of
censorship. Id State censorship by reviewing student pub-

lications is far more inconsistent with the Establishment
Clause than state funds provided to publications with religious
viewpoints based upon religiously neutral criteria. Id. The
censorship denied WAP of its
free speech rights and
"undermine[ d] the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires." Id at 726. Toconform
to the requirement ofthe Establishment Clause, it was not required that the State deny funds
based upon an organization's
views. Such government censorship creates negative feelings toward religious beliefs,
which in itself violates the very
principle of neutrality upon
which the Establishment Clause
is based. Id. Had the University honored its free speech duties, it would not have violated
the Establishment Clause. Id
The dissent harshly criticized the majority's analysis
on several points. It noted that
for the first time, the Court has
upheld a state program that provides direct funding to a religious activity of an organization. Id at737. Themandatory
student fee levied by the University was indistinguishable
from general government taxes, and accordingly, payment to
a religious group from the tax is
a blatant violation of the Establishment Clause. Id at 743-44.
The dissent reasoned that because of this violation, a
free speech inquiry was
unneccesary. Id at 755-56. It
concluded by entertaining a free
speech analysis and determined
that the University program did

not discriminate against W AP' s
views, but that it denied payment based upon its religious
activities. Id at 758.
The Supreme Court's
decision in Rosenberger v. Rec-

tor and Visitors oJthe University oj Virginia once again signified the importance of one's
free speech rights. By holding
that a group's free speech right
was violated by a state institution's attempt to follow the requirements ofthe Establishment
Clause, the Supreme Court declared the right of free speech is
of paramount importance, even
when such speech involves religious views. This holding
partially erodes the strict policy
of the separation of church and
state that the Constitution requires and will allow a greater
degree of state involvement in
religious activites in the future.

-Peter Greenbaum

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 26.2 / U. Bait. L.F. - 71

